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Redefining Boundaries: How Cohesive Technologies 
Altered Literal and Equivalent Infringement 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The difficulty of literature is not to write, but to write what you 
mean.”1 The human story is replete with instances where, due to its 
inherent limitations, language has failed to perfectly communicate an 
abstract idea.2 Patent drafting, with its objective to reduce an abstract and 
complex inventive concept to text while at the same time providing an 
adequate level of public notice of what is protected, is not immune from 
these limitations.3 In light of the impossibility of written text achieving 
perfect protection and perfect notice to the public of what is protected by 
the patent, the most one can hope for is reasonable protection and 
reasonable notice. The patent drafter must strike a delicate balance 
between protection of the inventor’s concept and sufficient public notice 
of what is protected.  
A simple example illustrates the problem. A hypothetical patent 
describes and claims the joining of two metal plates with a bolt. A 
competitor sells two metal plates joined with a rivet. In an infringement 
action, two different philosophies produce two different interpretations 
of the scope of the patent. Under a protectionist philosophy, the riveted 
plates infringe the patent because using a rivet in lieu of a bolt is a trivial 
and insignificant change to the substantive patented concept of joining 
two metal plates. This interpretation, while affording greater protection 
to the inventor, sacrifices clear public notice of what the patent covers by 
extending the scope of the patent beyond its literal terms. The disclosure 
in the patent was arguably not clear because it did not indicate to the 
 
 1. ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, Truth of Intercourse, in THE BIOGRAPHICAL EDITION OF THE 
WORKS OF ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON: VIRGINIBUS PUERISQUE AND OTHER PAPERS 61, 63 (1911). 
 2. One need not look past one’s own person to illustrate the oft-experienced limitations of 
written language. Popular phrases such as “Words can’t describe,” “I don’t know what to say,” “I’m 
speechless,” and “What do you mean?” are used on a daily basis and evidence the well-recognized 
inability of language to communicate ideas and emotions. 
 3. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) 
(“[T]he nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent 
application.”); Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Robert 
Unikel & Douglas Eveleigh, Protecting Inventors, Not Fortune Tellers: The Available Patent 
Protection for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 143–44 (2006) (discussing dual 
role of patent law). 
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public what constituted infringement. Under a disclosure philosophy, 
however, the riveted plates do not infringe the patent because they do not 
use a bolt, as is expressly disclosed and claimed in the patent. While 
under this philosophy the scope of the patent is clearly set forth to the 
public, it may not completely protect the inventive concept of the patent 
of joining two plates of metal.4 A significant body of case law has 
developed to strike a balance between these two adverse philosophies.5 
The doctrine of equivalents and its limitations try to strike this balance 
by permitting an “equivalent” device to infringe under certain 
circumstances when literal terms of the patent are not met.6 Ideally, 
when a battle between disclosure and protection necessitates such a 
balance, the interpretation of what is a reasonable disclosure and what is 
reasonable protection is left to those most qualified in the field.7 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Cohesive 
Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp. significantly altered that case law-
established balance when it relied on its own interpretation of the phrase 
“about 30 µm,” rather than leaving that interpretation to a qualified 
expert.8 In so doing, the court not only altered the well-established 
equivalent infringement analysis, but unnecessarily obscured the 
boundary between the analyses of equivalent infringement and literal 
infringement. As a result of this process, a patent loses its ability to fulfill 
its purpose to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”9 This 
Note engages in an analysis of the effects of the Cohesive decision on the 
existing area of patent practice. 
Part II of this Note briefly describes the purpose and history of 
equivalent infringement and its relation to literal infringement. Part III 
discusses the Federal Circuit’s treatment of Cohesive, highlighting how 
 
 4. Judge Learned Hand described that, in part, the doctrine of equivalents is provided “in 
misericordiam to relieve those who have failed to express their complete meaning.” Claude Neon 
Lights, Inc. v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 5. See generally Festo Corp., 525 U.S. 722 (indicating the difficulty in determining what is 
equivalent); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (clarifying the 
confusion inherent in the doctrine of equivalents); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 
339 U.S. 605 (1950) (determining when a device infringes upon a valid patent). 
 6. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21. For a more complete treatment of what constitutes 
an “equivalent,” see infra Part II.B.2. 
 7. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 25 (stating the importance of the opinion of one 
having reasonable skill in the art in determining equivalence). 
 8. 543 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008). When a decision is put before a jury, more extrinsic 
evidence is considered, including but not limited to expert testimony. With more evidence a greater 
likelihood exists that a more correct interpretation is reached. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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the court oversimplified the necessary analysis, disregarded its own legal 
ideology, and upset the historical balance between disclosure and 
protection. Part IV discusses the implications of the Cohesive decision on 
the future of patent law. Part V hypothesizes how Cohesive should have 
been decided by introducing a proposed simplified method. Part VI then 
summarizes this Note. 
II. STATE OF THE LAW 
A. Development of the Doctrine of Equivalents 
The constitutional purpose of a patent is “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts.”10 This is carried out by incentivizing 
inventive development by “securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”11 With the promise of exclusivity, it becomes imperative 
to determine the actual scope of the invention, so that it can be 
adequately protected; hence the need for the doctrine of equivalents to 
aid in determining that scope.  
Although a means to achieve the constitutional purpose of the patent 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”12 is through 
exclusivity, the efficiency with which this goal is achieved is a function 
of how accurately an invention is claimed and disclosed to the public.13 
A clearly defined scope of the patent allows potential developers 
(inventors, investors, businesses, etc.) to engage in competitive and 
developmental practices that will further “promote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts.”14 Without any sort of limitation on the 
doctrine of equivalents, these practices would be severely frustrated as a 
crafty patent drafter, through the use of cleverly chosen relative terms, 
could obtain patent protection greater than what was actually invented.15 
To combat such a situation, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112 as part of 
the Patent Act of 1952,16 which set forth what is known as “the 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Werner Stemer, The Doctrine of Equivalents after Hilton Davis and Markman, and a 
Proposal for Further Clarification, 22 NOVA L. REV. 783, 794 (1998) (“[P]atents . . . provide notice 
to the public as to what is and what is not available for general use.”). 
 14.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 15. Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 6 (2009). 
 16. Harold C. Wegner, The Disclosure Requirements of the 1952 Patent Act: Looking Back 
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enablement requirement.”17 Section 112 requires that a valid patent must 
“descri[be] . . . the invention, . . . the manner and process of making and 
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the 
same.”18 Requiring definite language effectively limits the crafty patent 
drafter in his overreaching endeavors. Equally as important as defining 
what has been invented, this enablement requirement creates an inherent 
disclosure of what has not been invented. By clearly defining a new 
endeavor, the enablement requirement provides an opportunity for 
potential developers to evaluate and pursue unprotected technological 
developments. This clearly fulfills the constitutional goals of patent law 
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”19 However, the 
enablement requirement and the constitutional grant of protective rights 
introduce the timeless struggle to balance two opposing interests—the 
inventor desiring broad interpretation, which affords him maximum 
protection, and the public desiring a well-defined interpretation, which 
affords a clear boundary of infringement. 
Although Congress has required definiteness in drafting patents, 
often words do not adequately describe the invention. This staunch 
enablement requirement, while precluding over-expansive drafting, 
allows crafty drafters to exploit the patented invention by making trivial, 
insignificant changes to the claimed invention to avoid infringement.20 
The judicially established “doctrine of equivalents” recognizes and seeks 
to remedy the difficulty by extending patent protection beyond the literal 
terms of a patent to more fully cover the inventive concept.21 The 
doctrine of equivalents states that “a product or process that does not 
literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may 
nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the 
elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of 
 
and a New Statute for the Next Fifty Years, 37 AKRON L. REV. 243, 243 (2004). 
 17. ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 18. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Holbrook, supra note 15, at 35 (describing how patent 
holders can gain patent protection beyond what they invented). 
 20. Holbrook, supra note 15, at 35. 
 21. Id. at 5 (declaring the doctrine of equivalents to be a judicially-created doctrine); see also 
Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 
78 (2004) (“In addition, the doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent a patent owner from losing 
effective protection because she did not draft claims that effectively cover what she invented.” 
(citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950))). 
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the patented invention.”22 Thus, a patent owner, by showing equivalence 
between the patented invention and the accused infringing device, can 
exercise his statutory right to exclude others from making or using his 
invention. 
To fulfill its constitutional purpose, a patent needs both the doctrine 
of equivalents and the enablement requirement: the doctrine of 
equivalents to protect the inventor and incentivize invention and the 
enablement requirement to apprise potential developers of the bounds of 
their development. At its most basic level, the doctrine of equivalents is 
one of fairness, requiring disclosure sufficient to inform the public of the 
protected invention while maintaining adequate protection and sufficient 
incentives for the inventor.23  
B. Mechanics of the Doctrine of Equivalents  
Just as it is difficult to balance the need for definiteness with the 
understanding that the invention is more of an idea rather than words, it 
is likewise difficult to determine if another patent is effectively 
equivalent. Therefore, after a patent owner has brought an infringement 
suit against an alleged infringer, a determination of what is equivalent 
must be made. This may be done through the use of extrinsic evidence 
or, as in the case of Cohesive, by the court’s own interpretation.24 
1. Procedural chronology 
While the doctrine of equivalents is available to a patent owner for 
the protection of his invention, there exists an analytical prerequisite of 
no infringement upon the literal terms before a patent owner can claim 
infringement by an equivalent.25 The determination of literal 
infringement is fairly straightforward. First, the governing body looks at 
the express terms of the patent.26 If the accused device is defined by 
those express claims, then the accused device infringes the claimed 
patent and the analysis is complete.27 Only if the accused device is 
 
 22. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (citing Graver 
Tank, 339 U.S. at 609). 
 23. Holbrook, supra note 15, at 14. 
 24.  Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 25. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 26. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607. 
 27. Id. 
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determined not to infringe literally on the patent should the more 
extensive doctrine of equivalents be considered.28  
Fully considering equivalence only after a finding of no literal 
infringement obviates a full doctrine of equivalents analysis in many 
infringement actions. Not every case that is brought before the judiciary 
requires an extensive analysis.29 Certain devices are so simple, 
comprised of only a few clear and simple claims, that determining 
whether they are infringed by an equivalent device is not only 
unnecessary but is actually burdensome to the judicial process. 
Conducting an extensive analysis for every case would overwhelm the 
judicial docket with extraneous expert testimony and analysis of the 
other elements required in a full doctrine of equivalents analysis.30 By 
distinguishing literal infringement from equivalent infringement, the 
courts promote judicial economy. 
An additional benefit to this bifurcation of infringement is the 
separation of the analysis techniques of literal infringement and 
equivalent infringement. This bifurcation shelters and preserves the more 
simple literal infringement analysis from infiltration by the more 
complete, time-intensive equivalent infringement analysis.31 Absent such 
bifurcation, elements of an equivalence analysis could leak into an 
analysis of a simple patent, thus unnecessarily complicating and 
prolonging the judicial process. By clearly delineating those cases that 
necessitate a more thorough equivalent-focused analysis, the court can 
maximize the efficiency of the judicial system by limiting a full 
equivalence analysis to those patents that require such a thorough 
analysis.32 By so limiting the application of the doctrine of equivalents, 
the court also ensures that those patents that only necessitate a simple 
analysis are quickly processed and issued as patents. 
 
 28. Black & Decker, 886 F.2d at 1295. 
 29. See, e.g., Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 
F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Int’l Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 772 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). In certain cases, not conducting a full doctrine of equivalents analysis is efficient 
because the doctrine of equivalents is sometimes unnecessary. 
 30. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 31. See TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1358-IEG (LAB) 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27468, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2002) (recognizing that because the court did not 
engage in doctrine of equivalents analysis, their job was simpler with only literal infringement to 
consider). 
 32. See Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing 
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed Cir. 1989) (requiring separate and 
distinct analysis for equivalent infringement)). 
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2. Determining equivalence 
Once a patent has been adjudged to necessitate a full doctrine of 
equivalents infringement analysis, it is extensively inspected to 
determine the scope of what the inventor actually invented. The 
difficulty of interpreting the patent requires that any interpretation be 
done by those most intimately familiar with the subject matter.33 The 
foundation upon which any determination of equivalence is made, as 
stated in Warner-Jenkinson, is that “a product or process . . . may . . . 
infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the . . . accused product . . . and 
the claimed elements.”34 From this foundation, many different tests have 
developed to assess when an accused device is in fact an equivalent.35  
 
a. Function-way-result. Under this test, an accused device infringes 
“if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same 
way to obtain the same result” as the patented device.36 
b. Insubstantial differences. The insubstantial differences test 
considers whether the accused device has differences from the patented 
device that are not substantial to its function.37 
 
c. Interchangeability. The interchangeability test factors whether 
“persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the 
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one 
that was” in determining whether the accused device is an equivalent to 
the patented device.38 
 
 
 33. Aquatex Indus. v. Techniche Solutions, 479 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen 
the patent holder relies on the doctrine of equivalents . . . the difficulties and complexities of the 
doctrine require that evidence be presented . . . through the . . . testimony of a person of ordinary 
skill in the art, typically a qualified expert.” (emphasis added)). 
 34. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997). 
 35. It is beyond the scope of this Note to offer a complete treatment of each of these methods, 
but it is sufficient to note the extensiveness of the analysis undertaken to interpret what constitutes 
an equivalent. For a more complete treatment of the different equivalence measurement criteria, see 
id. 
 36. Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878). 
 37. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40. While the court criticizes the usefulness of the 
insubstantial differences test, it at least recognizes its existence, which suits the scope of discussion 
in this Note. 
 38. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). 
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d. Foreseeability. Under the foreseeability test one considers whether 
it would have been foreseeable to one having “ordinary skill in the art”39 
to alter the patented device to produce the accused infringing device.40 
 
e. Should have been in possession. Under this test, the doctrine of 
equivalents also provides protection if, at the time of the invention, the 
inventor should have been in possession of the equivalent.41 
 
While the debate is lively over which definition of equivalence is 
correct, it is sufficient for the scope of this Note to conclude that an 
extensive analysis will be carried out when equivalence is questioned.  
3. Infringement analysis 
An understanding of the governing body conducting an infringement 
analysis is as important as understanding the analysis itself. While the 
determination of infringement by an expert in the field would be ideal, 
the current system for evaluating infringement allows for different 
decision makers. On the one hand, a matter may be classified as a 
question of law in the form of claim construction or a motion for 
summary judgment and therefore decided by a judge.42 On the other 
hand, infringement is traditionally a question of fact to be decided by a 
jury;43 this includes a determination of equivalent infringement.44 The 
jury’s analysis is often informed by expert witnesses and through other 
extrinsic evidence.45 While judges are more skilled in the art of 
interpretation,46 labeling the matter a question of law limits the scope of 
the record on which a decision may be based. Thus, allowing a jury to 
base its determination of infringement on the interpretations of experts 
who are intimately connected with the field results in a more accurate 
 
 39. See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 
2141.03 (8th ed., rev. 7, 2008). 
 40. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002); see 
also Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(Rader, J., concurring) (“[T]he doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject matter that the patent 
drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the application process and included in the claims.”). 
 41. Holbrook, supra note 15, at 14. 
 42. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996); see Cohesive Techs., 
Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 43. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384. 
 44. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388. 
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determination of infringement than when a judge is left to define a term 
based on his or her legal, but not technical, expertise.47 
In summary, the doctrine of equivalents is a tool distinct from literal 
infringement that in certain cases puts decision-making power in the 
hands of a jury, who compile evidence from experts who are best 
equipped to apply complex patent claims.48 By distinguishing between 
equivalent and literal infringement analyses, the court maximizes its time 
and conducts a full equivalence analysis only when cases so require.49 
While such an analysis can be complex, it ensures that a more 
application of the claim is reached. Thus, through the doctrine of 
equivalents, a proper balance between adequate disclosure and adequate 
protection is achieved while not overwhelming the judicial docket. 
However, this delicate balance has been threatened by the court’s 
analysis in Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp. 
III. COHESIVE TECHNOLOGIES V. WATERS CORP. 
A. Facts, Procedural Posture, and Holding 
1. Facts of the case and district court proceedings 
Beginning in 1998, Cohesive Technologies, Inc. asserted three 
separate causes of action against Waters Corporation for infringement of 
U.S. Patent Nos. 5,772,874 (the “‘874 patent”) and 5,919,368 (the “‘368 
patent”), both of which were issued to Cohesive.50 Both patents relate to 
high-performance liquid chromatography (“HPLC”).51 HPLC is a 
process for “separating, identifying, and measuring compounds 
contained in a liquid.”52 The process involves passing the 
liquid/compound mixture through a packed column of 
chromatographically active particles.53 As the liquid passes through the 
 
 47. See Cheryl Lee Johnson, The Continuing Inability of Judges to Pass Their Markman 
Tests: Why the Expanding Murkiness of the Task Leaves No Judge Behind, in HOW TO PREPARE & 
CONDUCT MARKMAN HEARINGS 2007, at 907 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 675, 
2007) for commentary on the increasing low quality of interpretation reached by judges during claim 
construction. 
 48. See Cont’l Oil Co. v. Cole, 634 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 49. See Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 50. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1357–58. 
 53. Id. at 1358. 
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columns, the compound is extracted or measured.54 The effectiveness of 
these columns at separating the compounds from the liquid depends on 
several variables including the diameter of the particles in the columns.55 
The claim at issue describes the device as “a chromatographic body 
formed as a substantially uniformly distributed multiplicity of rigid, 
solid, porous particles with chromatographically active surfaces, said 
particles having average diameters of greater than about 30 µm.”56  
Cohesive asserted its first infringement action against Waters 
claiming Waters’ Oasis HPLC 30 µm columns infringed Cohesive’s ‘874 
patent.57 During the pendency of the first action, a divisional application 
claiming priority of the ‘874 patent issued as the ‘368 patent.58 Cohesive 
asserted a second cause of action claiming that the same 30 µm columns 
of the Waters Oasis HPLC columns infringed the ‘368 patent.59 During 
the proceedings, Waters discontinued use of the 30 µm columns and 
began using replacement 25 µm columns.60 Cohesive then asserted its 
third cause of action, claiming that these replacement 25 µm columns 
infringed both patents.61 With regards to the third cause of action, the 
district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of 
Waters. The court found that neither the ‘874 patent nor the ‘368 patent 
was infringed, either literally or by an equivalent device.62 Cohesive 
challenged the district court’s construction of the phrase “about 30 
µm.”63 It is the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “about 30 µm” on 
appeal that highlights the importance of proper equivalence 
interpretation. 
2. Court of appeals’ holding and rationale 
a. Claim construction. The Court of Appeals first engaged in the 
difficult task of interpreting the phrase “about 30 µm” by determining the 
purpose of the size limitation.64 The court relied on the specification 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1359. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1368 (“[T]he word ‘about’ does not have a universal meaning in patent claims, and 
[its] meaning depends on the technological facts of the particular case.” (quoting Pall Corp. v. 
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indicating that the purpose of this limitation is to achieve high speed flow 
and corresponding turbulence.65  
The court then focused on two assertions from the specification to 
determine what range of diameters was covered by the “about 30 µm” 
claim language. In describing the porosity of the columns, the 
specification stated: 
To measure porosity, a number of batches of particles were examined, 
the first being a batch (designated herein as CT-50A1-002) of uncoated, 
unfunctionalized highly irregularly shaped, porous alumina particles 
having a nominal diameter of 50 [µm], but an actual mean diameter, as 
determined by Coulter analysis, of 42.39 [µm] within a 95% confidence 
factor.66 
Based on this statement, the court concluded that the specification treats 
an average diameter of 42.39 µm as an average diameter of about 50 µm, 
noting this represents an acceptable variance of at least 15.22%.67 The 
court then extrapolated that a similar variance was acceptable with 
regards to the 30 µm columns, concluding that “about 30 µm” should 
encompass at least between 25.434 µm and 34.566 µm.68 
Second, the court relied on the specification claiming that particles 
with a nominal diameter of 20 µm did not attain the desired turbulence.69 
The court then extrapolated the same 15.22% variance as a limit of 
“about 20 µm” to conclude that particles having actual diameters 
between 16.956 µm and 23.044 µm were not within the acceptable range 
of column diameters.70 This left a range between the upper limit 
diameter of 15.22% of 20 µm (23.044 µm) and the lower limit diameter 
of 15.22% of 30 µm (25.434 µm) for which the court could not interpret 
whether or not a diameter was “about 30 µm.”71 The court concluded 
 
Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995))). The court also stated that “[i]n 
determining how far beyond the claimed range the term ‘about’ extends the claim, ‘[w]e must focus . 
. . on the criticality of the [numerical limitation] to the invention.’” (quoting Ortho-McNeil Pharm., 
Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1369. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1369–70. 
 69. Id. at 1369. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1370. The range not accounted for is that between the lower limit of the 15.22% 
variance of 30 µm, 25.434 µm, and the upper limit of the 15.22% variance of 20, 23.044µm. 
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that any value within this remaining range that could achieve turbulence 
fell under the phrase “about 30 µm.”72  
The combination of these two interpretations founded the court’s 
final definition that “about 30 µm” is “either (1) greater than 25.434 µm 
(the lower limit of the 15.22% variance for 30 µm), or (2) both greater 
than 23.044 µm (the upper limit of the 15.22% variance for 20µm) and of 
sufficiently large size to assure that the column is capable of attaining 
turbulence.” 
 
b. Literal infringement. With the interpretation now set, the court 
moved on to its analysis of literal infringement. Assuming the facts in a 
light most favorable to the accused infringer (i.e. taking the average 
diameters of the accused 25 µm columns to be 25.16 µm73), the court 
found that the accused particles were not “about 30 µm” and concluded 
that whether or not the columns were able to attain turbulence was a 
question of fact.74 Therefore, the court held that the district court was 
incorrect to grant summary judgment on the literal infringement claim.75 
 
c. Equivalent infringement. The court then addressed the scope of the 
patent based on the doctrine of equivalents. The court used the function-
way-result test in determining what diameters were disclosed by the 
“about 30 µm” language.76 Based on this construction, and the fact that 
the term “about” was expressly used in the claim, the court of appeals 
held that the doctrine of equivalents was not available to the patentee.77 
The court justified this, stating that the patentee, by expressly including 
the term “about” in the claims, had covered the same “range of 
novelty”78 usually covered by the doctrine of equivalents and could not 
receive patent protection for “equivalents of equivalents.”79 Thus, the 
court affirmed the district court’s finding of no equivalent infringement 
and upheld the grant of summary judgment of no infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents.80 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 1367. Cohesive claimed that the actual average diameter of the 25 µm columns was 
29.01 µm. 
 74. Id. at 1371. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1372. 
 77. Id. 
 78.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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B. Analysis of Cohesive’s Holding and Rationale 
With the historic relationship between literal infringement and 
equivalent infringement so convoluted, the Court of Appeals had a 
striking opportunity to clarify and solidify this relationship. Instead, the 
Court of Appeals confused and weakened this relationship by conducting 
an inappropriate, oversimplified literal infringement analysis, altering the 
breadth of equivalent infringement (even against its own condemnation 
of doing so) and shifting the established balance between protection and 
disclosure. 
1. The District Court’s oversimplified analysis 
As stated above, the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is “to 
allow a finding of infringement where the accused product does not 
literally meet every limitation of a patent claim but does contain the legal 
equivalent thereof.”81 To determine whether a patent infringes under the 
doctrine of equivalents, the terms of the patent must be analyzed to 
determine the scope of the patent. The Cohesive court, by allowing the 
term “about” to fall within the realm of literal infringement, did not 
conduct sufficient analysis to interpret the scope of the patent. 
Generally, the ambiguity that compels the doctrine of equivalents is 
created by a complete absence of a term that properly defines the scope 
of the patent.82 However, relative terminology such as “about” no more 
adequately describes the bounds of an invention than does a complete 
omission of the term altogether and therefore likewise justifies a full 
equivalence analysis. The Cohesive court itself conceded this when, in 
interpreting the scope of the term “about,” it used the function-way-result 
test that is normally reserved for a doctrine of equivalents analysis.83 
However, even though the court recognized that the term “about” was 
sufficiently ambiguous to justify an application of an equivalence test, 
the court still incorrectly categorized the patent term to fall under literal 
infringement and under-analyzed its scope. 
By concluding that the “about 30 µm” language should fall under 
literal infringement,84 the court prevented the determination of a more 
accurate interpretation through a full doctrine of equivalents analysis. 
 
 81. Xytec Plastics, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., No. 91-1206, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 260, at *2 
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 1992).  
 82. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002). 
 83. Cohesive, 543 F.3d at 1372. 
 84. Id.  
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Instead, to determine what actual values fell within the “about 30 µm” 
range, the court relied solely on two statements in the patent 
specification.85 From these two statements alone, the court constructed 
the scope of “about 30 µm.” 86 There is no record of any outside 
consultation with those having ordinary skill in HPLC, no consideration 
of peer-reviewed literature, and nothing that resembles a doctrine of 
equivalents analysis that would verify that the court’s interpretation of 
“about” was in fact accurate. Additionally, in determining what “about” 
means statistically, the court equated the existence of differing particle 
diameters with their acceptability of being “about” a particular diameter, 
when there is no indication in the specification of any correlation 
between existence and acceptability.87 Aside from the mere statement 
that the function-way-result test should be applied in this situation,88 
there was nothing that by any classification could be construed as an 
appropriately thorough investigation of the scope of “about” in the 
chromatography context. 
The court’s finding not only altered the breadth and depth of the 
interpretive analysis but it also shifted the decision making authority.89 
By granting summary judgment, the court not only erred in 
oversimplifying the interpretive analysis, but it also erred by taking the 
decision out of the hands of the jury and consequently eliminating the 
assistance of those having ordinary skill in the art. The court thus bound 
Cohesive to the court’s interpretation, an interpretation that, given the 
lack of experience of the appellate judges in the specialized field of 
HPLC, may not have been accurate. 
Take, for example, the determination of what constitutes an 
acceptable variance. The court reasoned that because a compound having 
a nominal diameter of 50 µm contained particles with an actual diameter 
of 42.39 µm, this variance of 15.22% must be acceptable and thus 42.39 
µm was “about 50 µm.”90 However, the mere existence of these particles 
 
 85. Id. at 1369. See supra Part III.A.2.a. 
 86. Cohesive, 543 F.3d at 1369. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 1372. 
 89. Nystrom v. Trex Co., 580 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Judge Rader recognized the 
importance of this distinction, stating that “[a]lthough the tests are the same, the testers are different, 
which could produce different results in application of the same rules.” Id. While Judge Rader was 
discussing two distinct tests—the test for claim vitiation and the test under the doctrine of 
equivalents—the fact that these two tests are identical justifies the application of Judge Rader’s 
statement to a situation where two doctrine of equivalents tests are conducted by different testers. 
 90. Cohesive, 543 F.3d at 1369. 
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does not indicate acceptability, and no justification for such a conclusive 
correlation is found in the record. The court then extended this self-
determined “acceptable” variance to different column sizes.91 Again, no 
justification for this conclusion is given. It may be the case that 
acceptable variances vary with the size of the nominal diameter. 
The court’s accuracy in measurement also calls into question the 
sufficiency of its analysis. In calculating what the court determined to be 
an acceptable variance (and throughout the opinion), the court measured 
accuracy to five significant figures.92 As before, the record is empty of 
any justification for this degree of accuracy. The specification of the 
patent only used two significant figures,93 which suggests that a level of 
accuracy of five significant figures is not the industry standard. Rather, it 
was the judiciary that introduced this level of accuracy. 
Relative terms in a patent require a detailed inquiry into their true 
meaning. Such an inquiry requires thorough investigative measures such 
as consulting expert opinion and observing common practice in the field. 
By defining the term “about” under a literal infringement context, the 
court did not allow a full and complete doctrine of equivalents analysis to 
properly define the scope of the term and, by extension, of the patent. 
2. Expanded equivalent infringement 
In holding that Water’s 25 µm columns literally infringed Cohesive’s 
“about 30 µm” claim, the court effectively enlarged the scope of 
equivalent infringement despite its own declaration that such a practice 
would be improper.94 The court said that because the same “range of 
novelty” that was normally reserved to the doctrine of equivalents was 
now within the scope of literal infringement, “a patentee [could not] rely 
on the doctrine of equivalents to encompass equivalents of 
equivalents.”95 While this statement, in principle, is correct and 
equitable, the court in its holding actually promulgated an expansion of 
equivalence by permitting the term “about” to fall within literal 
infringement. 
 Under the Warner-Jenkinson definition of equivalent infringement, 
“a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express 
 
 91. Id. at 1370. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. at 1358. 
 94. See id. at 1372. 
 95. Id. 
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terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is 
‘equivalence.’”96 This statement defines an 
equivalent to be something that does not literally infringe.97 Therefore, 
by shifting “about” into the four corners of literal infringement, the court 
precludes itself from characterizing the accused device as an 
equivalent.98 This renders the court’s limitation that the doctrine of 
equivalents does not encompass an equivalent of an equivalent 
inapplicable as “about” is no longer an equivalent. 
All of this reasoning by the court results in a double-broadening of 
the scope of the patent through equivalence. First, the scope of the patent 
is broadened under literal infringement through the interpretation of the 
term “about.” The scope of the patent is broadened a second time 
through the doctrine of equivalents. It is this double-broadening that the 
court was trying to avoid by prohibiting the protection of an equivalent 
of an equivalent. It is also the exact result reached by the court when it 
pulled “about,” a relative term in need of interpretation, into literal 
infringement. 
3. Altered balance between disclosure and protection 
The court’s decision was also incorrect because it disturbed a 
hallmark of the patent system, the balance between public disclosure and 
patent protection.99 To foster an adequate disclosure, Congress enacted 
the enablement requirement.100 While the permitted use of relative 
terminology offers some relief from the enablement requirement, the 
disclosure still must be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.101 
The Cohesive court, by relying on its own interpretation of the term 
“about” rather than that of one having ordinary skill in the art, altered in 
 
 96. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (emphasis 
added). 
 97. See Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 812 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires the patentee to prove that the 
accused device contains an equivalent for each limitation not literally satisfied.” (emphasis added)). 
 98. The court’s inconsistency on this point is manifest in the opinion as the court first noted 
that “by electing to include the broadening word ‘about’ in the claim, the patentee has . . . captured 
what would otherwise be equivalents within the literal scope of the claim,” then later classified the 
term as an equivalent. Cohesive, 543 F.3d at 1372 (emphasis added). 
 99. Unikel & Eveleigh, supra note 3, at 143–44 (“The Supreme Court has made it clear that . 
. . the patent laws themselves, have two basic, intertwined goals: to foster and reward invention, and 
to promote public disclosure of inventions so as to stimulate further innovation.”). 
 100. Wegner, supra note 16, at 258 (2004). 
 101. See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, supra note 39, § 2173. 
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part the enablement requirement and thus the balance between patent 
protection and public disclosure. 
The doctrine of equivalents is a balancing act between adequate 
protection and adequate disclosure.102 An appropriate balance is 
impossible with relative terms and requires an accurate interpretation of 
these terms to determine the scope of the patent and whether that scope 
has been properly disclosed. Such an interpretation is best made by those 
with expertise in the field.103 The Cohesive court failed to rely on a 
qualified interpretation of the terms. As a result, the accuracy of the 
court’s interpretation cannot be verified because there is no indication of 
how one having ordinary skill in the art would understand it, as is 
required by the enablement requirement. Thus, without a qualified 
interpretation or any indication of the accuracy of the court’s 
interpretation, there can likewise be no indication of whether the 
disclosure in the patent is adequate. Therefore, the court’s acceptance of 
its own interpretation of “about” weakened the patent’s responsibility to 
disclose to the public what had been invented. 
4. Summary 
The term “about” is relative by nature and is subject to many 
interpretations. To ensure that an accurate interpretation is used, a 
detailed analysis is needed. The doctrine of equivalents affords such a 
detailed analysis. Nevertheless, the Cohesive court termed “about” not to 
be a case of equivalent analysis, but rather one of literal analysis. This 
oversimplified the analysis, altered the scope of the patent under the 
doctrine of equivalents, and disrupted the established balance between 
patent protection and public disclosure. Thus, the analysis of the court 
was inadequate in light of the facts and complexity of the case. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COHESIVE DECISION 
A. Introduction 
The decision in Cohesive was not made in a vacuum; the misgivings 
of the court’s holding reaches beyond the pages of the Cohesive record in 
 
 102. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
 103. See Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp. v. Estee Lauder Cos., No. 00 Civ. 5960 (RMB)(AJP), 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13004, at *43 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2003) (stating that an “expert’s 
construction may be the only true meaning of the patent language.”). 
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four ways.104 First, the Cohesive decision affects patent drafting as 
drafters may be able to take advantage of relative terminology being 
considered under literal infringement, while equivalent infringement 
analysis, though still considered under the name of literal infringement, 
has been limited. Drafters could overbroaden the scope of a patent by 
relying on what could be a misinterpretation of the relative term by the 
court, rather than the actual interpretation by one having skill in the art. 
Second, since the court brought equivalent analysis into literal 
infringement,105 the current and future state of the doctrine of 
equivalents is uncertain. Third, the greater latitude allowed in 
interpretation increases the opportunity for inventors and their attorneys 
to engage in inequitable conduct. Fourth, the shift in balance between 
public disclosure and patent protection reduces the economic value of a 
patent and inhibits the economic growth that patents were meant to 
stimulate.106 
B. Patent Drafting 
A well-drafted claim is supremely important to the inventor because 
it is the portion of the patent that determines the extent of the protection 
for the invention.107 Reducing an abstract idea to words is a very time-
consuming, difficult task; to some it is an art.108 Therefore, it is no 
surprise that patent drafters put much time and effort into drafting clear 
claims. A well-drafted claim by an experienced attorney gives the 
inventor adequate patent protection while disclosing to the public a clear 
scope of the patented invention. However, by relying on its own 
 
 104. The Author does not claim that these are the only four aspects of the law influenced by 
the Cohesive decision. 
 105. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“‘[A]bout 
30 µm’ encompasses particle diameters that perform the same function, in the same way, with the 
same result as the 30 µm particles . . . Thus, by electing to include the broadening word ‘about’ in 
the claim, the patentee has . . . captured what would otherwise be equivalents within the literal scope 
of the claim.”). 
 106. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 698–99 (2000) (“Similarly, the primary impact of the American patent system is 
economic as well. . . . Economic research has shown that the national patent system has an important 
impact on long term international economic competitiveness and that patent law can function as a 
public policy tool for promoting national economic growth.”). 
 107. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., 
concurring) (expressing the importance of the claims in litigation stating, “to decide what the claims 
mean is nearly always to decide the case.”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, 
752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 108. Zenon Envtl., Inc. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 506 F.3d 1370, 1382 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:51 PM 
879 Redefining Boundaries 
 897 
interpretation rather than testimony from experts and common practice 
from the field, the court discourages such clear and precise patent 
drafting. 
Patent drafting is an involved process that takes years of practice to 
perfect. With each invention, drafters spend numerous hours in 
consultation to ensure that the complete and accurate picture of that 
invention is protected in the patent. Because the accuracy of the court’s 
interpretation cannot be determined, patent drafters are discouraged from 
perfecting the claims. Not knowing whether the court will adhere to the 
inventor’s intended interpretation or use its own construct affects the cost 
and quality of applications.109 On the one hand, prosecution costs 
become even more expensive as drafters spend even more billable hours 
poring over each word to a degree unwarranted by the patent. Or, by 
contrast, a drafter may simply draft a few quick claims, include some 
relative terms, move on to the next patent, and be no worse off for so 
doing—still being bound by the arbitrary interpretation of the court. This 
process, where a patent drafter intentionally drafts claims with 
indiscernible terminology to obtain unjustified protection, could lead to 
much more objectionable circumstances. More specifically, Cohesive’s 
altering of the doctrine of equivalents threatens the effectiveness and 
frustrates the purpose of the claim itself. A broad interpretation of the 
doctrine of equivalents conflicts with the statutory enablement 
requirement for claims.110 The Cohesive court effectively expanded the 
scope of equivalent infringement, giving it a broader application and 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the claim to define and protect an 
invention.111 
By interpreting the claims as it did, the court discouraged clear, 
definite drafting and may have opened the door for intentionally 
overambiguous drafting. 
C. State of the Doctrine of Equivalents 
In addition to potentially upsetting professional standards in patent 
drafting, the Cohesive decision also has thrown the entire doctrine of 
equivalents, including its relation to literal infringement, into a state of 
confusion. By including the doctrine of equivalents analysis within literal 
 
 109. See Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 215, 
219–20 (2004). 
 110. Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997); Alwin Mfg. 
Co. v. Global Plastics, 629 F. Supp. 2d 869, 874–75 (E.D. Wis. 2009).  
 111. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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infringement, two potential outcomes may result. First, the doctrine of 
equivalents may disappear because the elements of its analysis would be 
entirely swallowed by literal infringement. Second, as discussed above, 
the doctrine of equivalents may remain intact, but the patent scope might 
be vastly broadened through the doctrine of equivalents.112 While both 
of these results may represent extreme possibilities, they serve to 
illustrate that the Court of Appeals, by commingling equivalent analysis 
within a literal infringement context, has confused the state of the 
doctrine of equivalents. 
1. Absorbed into literal infringement 
Under the first potential outcome of Cohesive, literal infringement 
would become much more complex. By allowing a portion of the 
doctrine of equivalents analysis to fall under literal infringement,113 the 
Cohesive court has opened the door to let in the rest of the doctrines 
associated with equivalence analysis.114 This would invalidate the 
purpose of distinguishing between literal infringement analysis and 
equivalent infringement analysis altogether, discourage judicial 
economy, and back up the judicial docket. For example, a full doctrine of 
equivalents analysis,115 now being combined with literal infringement 
analysis, would no longer be utilized only after a literal infringement 
analysis but rather would be undertaken in every infringement case. 
A completely different outcome could result where instead of the 
doctrine of equivalents elements being subsumed into literal 
infringement, these elements are abandoned completely. One example is 
the Festo limitation. Under the Festo doctrine, a patent owner is 
precluded from using the doctrine of equivalents to broaden claims that 
were intentionally narrowed during prosecution to facilitate the granting 
of a patent.116 However, by authorizing the doctrine of equivalents to fall 
under literal infringement, the Cohesive court has allowed for the 
potential abandonment of important equivalent limitations.  
To illustrate the point, consider the simple example of an invention 
for a ball with a diameter of ten to twelve inches. Consider next that the 
examiner requires the patentee to amend the claim to limit the diameter 
 
 112. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 113. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (using 
the function-way-result test to determine literal infringement). 
 114. This includes but is not limited to items discussed in Part II.B.2. 
 115. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 116. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734–35 (2002). 
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of the ball to twelve inches. Under Festo, the patentee is now precluded 
in future proceedings from claiming a ten inch diameter ball as being an 
equivalent to the claimed twelve inch diameter ball.117 Now suppose, 
rather, that the original patent, instead of claiming a ball with a diameter 
of ten to twelve inches, claimed a ball with a diameter of about twelve 
inches. Under Cohesive this is termed literal infringement, to which 
Festo does not apply, and thus a Festo limitation would be completely 
avoided.118 As a result, there is nothing in place to prevent finding that a 
ball of ten inches in diameter, which under Festo would be unpatentable 
and noninfringing, would be an infringement if the patent was instead 
phrased as “about twelve inches.”119 The overall ambiguity permitted in 
literal infringement under the Cohesive analysis provides more 
opportunities for the kind of behavior Festo was meant to limit, with less 
opportunity to protect against it through the Festo decision. 
2. Broadened equivalent scope 
The second outcome that could result from the inclusion of 
equivalent infringement into literal infringement is a broadening of the 
scope of equivalence. Under the pre-Cohesive framework, when 
infringement is not found by the literal terms of the claim, a patent owner 
may seek protection under the doctrine of equivalents.120 Under a 
Cohesive interpretation of the standard system, one equivalence analysis 
occurs under literal infringement, although not expressly labeled as such, 
followed by the normal analysis under the doctrine of equivalents.121 
This occurs in spite of Cohesive’s indication that doing so should not be 
allowed.122 Such a regime, therefore, permits two opportunities to 
broaden the patent. This could—and likely would—result in patents that 
protect more than what was actually invented. 
As with all debated and controversial doctrines of law, lower courts, 
attorneys, and the public in general look to appellate courts to determine 
and clarify doctrines. Patent law and its doctrine of equivalents are no 
exception. In the patent system the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction for all patent cases that are 
 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 121. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 122. See id. 
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appealed.123 This affirms the relationship where lower courts look to the 
Court of Appeals for clarification. However, instead of providing 
direction and clarifying the doctrine of equivalents and its relation to 
literal infringement, the court blurred both the status of the doctrine of 
equivalents and its relation to literal infringement. While both potential 
resulting states of the doctrine of equivalents following Cohesive may be 
extreme, they suffice to illustrate the increased confusion resulting from 
the decision. 
D. Promote Inequitable Conduct 
The infringement analysis promoted in the Cohesive decision creates 
more opportunity for inequitable conduct at the drafting and 
prosecutorial stages. While maximizing protection of a patent within the 
newly created bounds is not unethical on its face, some attorneys may 
use the law as a mechanism to unjustly benefit themselves or their 
clients. The court’s oversimplified analysis in Cohesive creates another 
avenue through which lawyers can so act. 
 
The Cohesive court’s simplified literal infringement/equivalent 
infringement hybrid analysis creates greater opportunity for crafty 
drafters to expand patent protection beyond the invented concept. By 
switching from a more thorough equivalent-style analysis to a simplified 
literal-style analysis, the court left out some elements of a standard 
equivalence analysis.124 While at some point in the future all of these 
elements may join the equivalent infringement analysis, there is no 
telling how or when such a transformation will occur, and until that time, 
these elements will most likely be ignored entirely.125 Thus, drafters, 
intending to evade a necessary full equivalence analysis when one might 
be justified and necessary, could draft patents to be intentionally 
ambiguous, avoid a thorough analysis, and obtain more patent protection 
than warranted. Again, although taking advantage of ambiguities is not in 
itself inequitable conduct, a distinction must be made between those 
attorneys who are fulfilling their professional duty to competently protect 
 
 123. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 651 
(1999). 
 124. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 125. This argument does not negate the discussion in Part IV.C.1 concerning the potential of 
absorbing all equivalent elements into literal infringement. It merely recognizes the time lag that will 
naturally occur as the full realm of equivalent analysis elements trickles in to the new, adapted literal 
infringement. 
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the interests of their clients and those attorneys who find gaps in the 
system and engage in deceptive and concealing practices. Those of the 
latter persuasion could create ambiguities wherein they may argue before 
a court to expand the actual scope of the invention. Even though such a 
practice is not inherently inequitable, it does promote concealment and 
contradicts the purpose of patent law to disclose the invention to the 
public. Cohesive’s double-broadening regime increases the likelihood of 
this type of deceptive practice, first through an equivalent-like literal 
infringement, and then again under the actual doctrine of equivalents 
analysis.126  
By restricting the use of expert witnesses and other analytical tools 
available in a jury consideration of equivalence,127 the Cohesive decision 
creates more opportunities for an unpredictable and arbitrary outcome. 
The difference in the knowledge base of legal professionals and that of 
experts in the field creates gaps that patent drafters and inventors can 
exploit to gain unwarranted legal protection of something the inventor 
did not invent. While this difference itself is not improper, the danger lies 
in the clever drafter, who discovers an interpretation that falls into one of 
these gaps, being reasonable to a judge, but known to one having 
ordinary skill in the art to be unreasonable. These gaps highlight why 
many courts have stated that allowing lawyers to act as expert witnesses 
and offer their opinions as to claim interpretation is inappropriate.128 
This rule by extension should apply to judges as well, who lack the same 
expertise in the pertinent art as do lawyers. Although a court’s role is to 
protect the substantive rights of the public and ensure justice, the 
Cohesive court failed to fulfill its role and provided more opportunities 
for wily drafters to engage in inequitable conduct.129 
E. Reduced Economic Value of the Patent 
The great value of a patent both to the inventor and to the “[p]rogress 
of Science and useful Arts” is its power to exclude others from practicing 
the protected invention.130 While broadening the scope of a patent under 
 
 126. Supra Part III.B.2. This result would occur despite the court’s comment in Cohesive that 
such a result is undesirable. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 127. Supra Part II.B.2. 
 128. See Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 122 F.3d 1040, 1042 
(Fed. Cir. 1997).  
 129. Cohesive, 543 F.3d at 1372. 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Cohesive increases the economic value of an individual patent, this value 
is offset as a whole as potential investors, unsure of what constitutes 
infringement of a particular patent, will refrain from investing in patents 
and the development of patentable ideas, thus impeding, rather than 
promoting “the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”131 
If nothing else, the Cohesive decision brought increased uncertainty 
into infringement litigation. Infringement litigation is an expensive 
endeavor without the increased uncertainty imposed by Cohesive.132 The 
Cohesive opinion increased the cost as a full equivalent analysis will now 
be undertaken in every case of infringement. To avoid this, the 
competent patentee will demand greater work to be done during 
prosecution, both in research and drafting, to ensure that the invention is 
accurately captured by the claims and avoids infringement.133 Such an 
increase in cost would not only delay the ultimate public disclosure of a 
patent, but could also prevent some patents from ever being issued 
because some inventors can never hope to be able to afford the costly 
application process.134 
This uncertainty not only affects potential patentees but also society 
in general. The same fear and uncertainty that inhibit inventors from 
pursuing a patent weigh even more heavily upon investors who will 
potentially infringe. Thus, in a cost-benefit analysis, a large investor who 
could otherwise afford expensive patent acquisition may not be able to 
afford the potential damages resulting from a judgment of infringement 
and accordingly, decide not to invest at all. That is not to say this 
problem was created by Cohesive, just that it increased its frequency. As 
a result of this uncertainty, not only may fewer patents be prosecuted and 
issued, but investors, in an effort to keep as distant as possible from 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States 
Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 
56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 961 n.212 (2004) (explaining that in 2003 the “average cost of a patent 
infringement suit with more than $25 million at risk was $2.5 million through the end of discovery, 
and approximately $4 million for all costs, including discovery, trial and appeal” and that in 1999 
about $2 billion was spent on patent litigation (citing Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n, 2003 Report of 
Economic Survey, 22 (2003))). 
 133. Holbrook, supra note 15, at 29–30 (“Patent owners now . . . requir[e] greater upfront and 
perhaps unwarranted prosecution costs given the uncertainties of the prosecution process, of patent 
litigation, and of the ultimate value of the invention contained within the patent.”). 
 134. While slight in comparison to the cost of infringement litigation, preparing and filing a 
patent can range from $6,000 to $15,000. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s 
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 780 (2009). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2013 3:51 PM 
879 Redefining Boundaries 
 903 
infringement, may not attempt to compete, and as a result, technological 
development of “Science and the useful Arts” could be hindered.135 
The implications of the Cohesive decision are far-reaching and 
illustrate that Cohesive was wrongly decided because of the uncertainty it 
promoted, the purposes of patent law that it contradicted, and the adverse 
economic effects which result to the potential patentee and society as a 
whole. 
V. A PROPOSED METHOD AND HOW COHESIVE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ANALYZED 
A. Introduction 
After having addressed the rationale of the Cohesive court’s analysis 
and a few of its negative implications on patent law, this Note now offers 
a proposed method for analyzing relative terminology used in patent 
claims. It will also discuss how this proposed analysis might have 
changed the outcome in Cohesive while avoiding the negative 
implications of the Cohesive decision. This proposed method consists of 
defining “about” and other relative terminology to be definite terms that 
are to be interpreted by those of ordinary skill in the art. Such an 
interpretation takes the decision away from the court, puts it in qualified 
hands, maintains the integrity and simplicity of the literal infringement 
analysis, and promotes judicial economy. 
B. A Proposed Method 
In considering this proposed method, it must be immediately 
recognized that the Cohesive court was on the right track by determining 
that some form of a doctrine of equivalents analysis was necessary.136 
However, the court did not correctly apply the doctrine of equivalents to 
“about,” a relative term that deserves a much deeper analysis. Therefore, 
the first characteristic of the proposed method is a legal definition of 
relative terms such as “about,” which recognizes that the drafter’s 
purpose in using such terms is to allow the scope of a patent to be 
interpreted by a jury. 
 
 135. Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Society at 
large would bear these latter costs in the form of virtual foreclosure of competitive activity within 
the penumbra of each issued patent claim. Because the doctrine of equivalents blurs the line of 
demarcation between infringing and non-infringing activity, it creates a zone of uncertainty, into 
which competitors tread only at their peril.”). 
 136. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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The second element of the proposed method requires courts to 
acknowledge that the legal definition of relative terms should be a 
question of fact subject to interpretation by those with ordinary skill in 
the art. The problem with the current system is that upon including a 
relative term into the literal terms of a patent, the potential patentee is 
still subject to the interpretation of the court in a Markman hearing.137 
Thus, one might rightfully say that such a situation puts the inventor in 
no better position. Whether the interpretation is done by the court 
through literal infringement, as in Cohesive, or through a Markman 
hearing, the patent owner is still subject to the discretion of the court. 
The definition of the relative term would be deemed unambiguous, thus 
alleviating the need to have it interpreted during a Markman hearing. 
The third element of the proposed method is to ignore the relative 
term altogether when considering literal infringement. Without this 
element, the same problem of reduced judicial efficiency resulting from 
Cohesive would result.138 This element is necessary to maintain the 
separation between literal infringement and equivalent infringement. 
This separation serves to promote judicial economy by restricting literal 
infringement use to those cases where it is necessary while still providing 
the doctrine of equivalents remedy when justified. 
The last characteristic of the proposed method is to label 
interpretation of relative terminology a question of fact, not of law. This 
returns the decision-making power to the jury and, by extension, to one 
having ordinary skill in the art, thus ensuring that a more accurate 
interpretation and scope are determined. 
C. Problems Resolved by the Proposed Method 
The proposed method solves many of the problems evidenced in the 
Cohesive decision. First, it does not alter any existing doctrine. Second, it 
protects the value of the patent to both the patentee and the public by 
maintaining the established balance between patent protection and public 
disclosure. Lastly, it promotes judicial economy. In summary, the 
proposed method increases the likelihood that an accurate scope of the 
patent will be determined in an efficient, cost-effective manner. 
 
 137. See Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(characterizing and deciding infringement matters as a matter of claim construction). A Markman 
hearing is a pretrial claim construction hearing where interpretation is decided by a judge. Donald S. 
Chisum, 5A-18 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.06 (2011). 
 138. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
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1. Does not alter existing doctrine 
The Cohesive decision had the potential to drastically alter literal 
infringement and the doctrine of equivalents and the interaction between 
them.139 Additionally, the status of the enablement requirement was put 
into question as the relative term “about” was interpreted broadly. By 
using the proposed method, none of the underlying doctrines or their 
applications change. All that changes is that relative terms such as 
“about” are labeled and treated as ordinary understanding indicates they 
should be. 
2. Protects value of a patent to owner and public 
In a similar fashion, the proposed method protects the value of a 
patent by leaving doctrines of patent law unaltered. The patent owner can 
still reasonably rely on the same literal and equivalent infringement 
analysis to enforce and obtain adequate protection for his patent. 
Likewise, the public is under no greater threat from ignorant 
infringement as the enablement requirement, and an interpretation is still 
made by one having ordinary skill in the art. 
One might argue that under this proposed method, which allows 
relative terms to be used in a patent, the ability to clearly disclose the 
invention is diminished. However, the same amount of disclosure exists 
under the proposed framework as under the pre-Cohesive standard, 
which allows relative terminology in a patent. Under the pre-Cohesive 
standard, a competitor attempting to design around a patent could only 
make a product and hope that it did not infringe through equivalence. 
The proposed method is no different. In fact, by permitting relative 
terminology in a patent, the proposed method may increase disclosure, as 
the allowance of such terms put any potential improvers on notice that 
equivalents are included within the scope of the patent.  
3. Promotes judicial economy 
By allowing the term “about” to be ignored under literal 
infringement analysis, judicial economy is promoted, as relatively simple 
cases can be dealt with quickly, while those cases requiring more 
analysis are investigated. While it may seem counterintuitive to ignore an 
express term in a claim, the result is no different than under the standard 
system. Under the standard system, a device not falling within a numeric 
 
 139. See supra Part IV.C. 
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range does not literally infringe. The court then determines whether it 
infringes under the doctrine of equivalents. By ignoring the term “about,” 
the same device does not literally infringe under the proposed method. 
Only during an equivalent analysis is the term considered, which is the 
same as the pre-Cohesive system. Thus, the judicial docket is maintained 
in its pre-Cohesive state. 
4. Summary 
The overall benefit of the proposed method is that it does not change 
anything. Years of precedent and judicial analysis have established a 
system that works. Cohesive suggests turning all that upside down. The 
proposed method, by comparison, merely attempts to apply established 
doctrine to a new situation. The adaptation proposed under the proposed 
method does not alter any existing legal doctrine, it retains the value of a 
patent by maintaining the balance between disclosure and protection, and 
it promotes judicial economy. 
D. The Proposed Method Applied to Cohesive 
It is hard to say with any degree of certainty how Cohesive would 
have been decided had the proposed method been utilized. However, it is 
no stretch to imagine that the result could have been dramatically 
different in several elements of the court’s analysis. By more closely 
inspecting 1) the knowledge of those having skill in the art, 2) the 
knowledge of the patentee, and 3) assumptions inherent in a relative 
term, the court may have reached a different decision.  
First, the aspect of the proposed method that would have had the 
most profound difference in the outcome is its reliance on experts in the 
field, instead of a judge, to decide the scope of the patent. The court said 
that “particle diameters that perform the same function, in the same way, 
with the same result as the 30 µm particles,”140 are “about 30 µm.” The 
court then simply mentions that this “same result” is achieving 
turbulence without any further investigation as to whether it in fact was 
the same result.
 141 Under the proposed method, the court would have 
looked into what the field actually determines to be a “same” result. 
Also, in defining “about 30 µm,” the court relied on an arbitrary 
statistical analysis of a batch of particles with a diameter of 50 µm with 
 
 140. Cohesive, 543 F.3d at 1372. 
 141. See id. at 1368–69 (“[T]hat turbulence could not be attained with particles of 20 µm 
diameters. Thus, about 30 µm cannot include 20 µm.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). 
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no indication that the analysis could validly extend to define “about 30 
µm.”142 Under the proposed method, instead of engaging in an 
unsubstantiated statistical analysis,143 the court would simply rely on 
testimony from the field. 
Second, an important element in any equivalent analysis is the 
question of whether the patentee should have or did know of the 
infringing device.144 In Cohesive, by considering equivalent terminology 
under literal infringement, it appears the court dropped this element from 
the analysis.145 This element would have been addressed under an 
analysis using the proposed method. 
Lastly, the court also decided that 20 µm, because it could not 
achieve turbulence, was therefore not “about 30 µm.”146 This conclusion 
by the court is based on a desired characteristic rather than on what 
actually is “about 30 µm.”147 Rather than interpreting with an 
assumption of validity, the court should have first interpreted the term 
based on how one having ordinary skill in the art would have understood 
the term and then determined validity. The fact finder under the proposed 
method could do this by relying on expert testimony to define “about 30 
µm” and then used that definition to determine whether 20 µm really was 
valid or not. 
While a determination of how the Cohesive court would have ruled 
under the proposed method requires the jury to consider the testimony of 
how one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “about,” the 
points discussed above illustrate the great likelihood that a different 
result could have arisen from an application of the proposed method to 
the Cohesive facts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of equivalents is a naturally obscure and confusing 
doctrine. As such, appellate courts should provide direction on the 
matter. In Cohesive, the Court of Appeals had the opportunity to clarify 
the doctrine of equivalents and its relation to literal infringement. 
However, through an oversimplified analysis, an unnecessary expanding 
of the equivalent analysis, and an upsetting of the balancing between 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 144. See supra Part II.B.2.e. 
 145. Cohesive, 543 F.3d at 1371. 
 146. Id. at 1369. 
 147. Id. 
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patent protection and public disclosure, the court muddied the doctrine. 
Had the court used the proposed method, it could have avoided the patent 
broadening, uncertainty,  
increased potential for fraud, and reduced economic patent value that 
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